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Raymond Williams’s Keywords: investigating meanings ‘offered, felt 
for, tested, confirmed, asserted, qualified, changed’  
 
This is an author’s pre-final copy of an article published in Critical Quarterly, 48/4 
(Winter 2006), pp.1-26. 
 
When the second edition of Keywords: a Vocabulary of Culture and Society was 
published in 1983, Raymond Williams added notes on a further twenty one words 
(including 'ecology', 'ethnic', 'liberation', 'regional', 'sex' and 'western') to the original 
110 entries of the 1976 first edition. Some of those words, Williams says in his brief 
„Preface to the Second Edition‟, had been re-introduced from the original list he had 
worked on during the 1950s as a supplement to Culture and Society (1780-1950). 
Others, he adds, had 'become important in the period between that original list and the 
present time'
1
. The 1983 edition of Keywords sadly turned out to be the last. With 
Williams's death in January 1988, the process of revising existing words - and adding 
extra words, if needed - came to an end. The question therefore remains open 
whether, more than two decades later, a tranche of extra words would now be needed 
to reflect the work‟s original ambitions. Or would the consolidated group of 131 
words, having been central (as Williams saw it) to successive formations of cultural 
thinking over at least the century-and-a-half which forms the time-span of Culture and 
Society, still be broadly the keywords now, snowballing and redefining senses but not 
yielding up their work of cultural definition to other terms?  
 
This question would be a practical matter for an editor contemplating a third, updated 
edition of Keywords. At the same time, it raises once more the theoretical issues - 
about meaning change and about the relation between vocabulary and 
conceptualisation – that were Williams‟s own starting points in collecting notes in 
folders on his shelf half a century earlier.   
 
                                                 
1
 Keywords, p.27. Culture and Society 1780-1950 was published by Chatto and Windus in 1958, nearly 
twenty years before the first edition of Keywords. All references to Keywords below are to the 2
nd
 
(1983) edition. In order not to clutter the text, where I quote from a clearly identified entry no page 
reference is given. Page references are provided, however, for all quotations from the „Introduction‟ or 
other general material in Keywords. 
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The publication in 2005 of Tony Bennett et al‟s New Keywords2 offered one possible 
answer to both the practical and theoretical questions. The editors of that collection 
list 142 words, forty one coinciding with Williams‟s selection but with 101 new 
entries, including „alternative‟, „celebrity‟, „desire‟, „queer‟, and many others that 
scarcely feature in Williams‟s writing, extensive though that is. The resulting book is 
a wide-ranging glossary of contemporary cultural studies. But the overlap with 
Williams is far from complete. Differences exist not only in the wordlist but also in 
overall approach, despite the editors‟ suggestion that „other modifications we have 
made to the Keywords model are minor compared with the shift to a collective and 
more international mode of production‟3. Downplaying any apparent shift between 
„new‟ and original in their tribute to Williams in their own „Introduction‟, Bennett, 
Grossberg and Morris quietly (and I believe misleadingly) claim the mantle of 
Williams's original undertaking.
4
  
 
Prompted by likely influence of the Blackwell volume on readers unfamiliar with 
Williams‟s work, as well as by unresolved issues in Williams's „keywords‟ research 
itself, I propose in what follows to outline what I take to be distinctive in Williams's 
publication of dictionary-like entries for culturally central but difficult „key‟ words. 
By way of conclusion, I outline the continuing challenge of investigating „keywords‟ 
in the 21st century.  
 
What is a 'keyword’? 
If you  google
5
 „keyword‟ and look through your first twenty results, the chances are 
you will find only references to using target words in  searchable databases or for 
finding relevant web pages.  In the fragments of text on your screen, the word 
                                                 
2
 Tony Bennett, Lawrence Grossberg and Meaghan Morris (eds), New Keywords: a revised vocabulary 
of culture and society (Blackwell, Oxford, 2005). 
3
 Bennett et al, New Keywords,  xxi. 
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 This is not the place for a review of New Keywords.  Among  many examples of difference in overall 
approach, perhaps the most startling is that, on the website for the book 
(www.blackwellpublishing.com/newkeywords ), under the banner „What would your key words be?‟, 
the editors invite readers to suggest their own words to be included in a future contents list, with entries 
by a certain date to be entered into a prize draw. 
5
 „Google‟ is the trademarked named of the Google search engine. Increasingly, however, as 
occasionally happens with successful branded products, the name is adopted in (unprotected) generic 
use, often visible as derived forms (e.g. „to google‟, „googling‟, „etc.). Such „genericisation‟ typically 
involves an intermediate stage during which generic use is contested by the trademark proprietor.  
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„keyword‟ will collocate, or be found next to, words such as „smart‟ and „good‟, as 
well as sometimes combining to form the compound „meta-keyword‟ (or way of 
targeting clusters of keywords rather than individual words).  Similar emphasis is to 
be found in online dictionaries specialising in computer and internet technology 
definitions. In Webopedia, for example, we are given the following senses:  
(1) In text editing and database management systems, a keyword is an index 
entry that identifies a specific record or document.  
(2) In programming, a keyword is a word that is reserved by a program 
because the word has a special meaning. Keywords can be commands or 
parameters. Every programming language has a set of keywords that cannot be 
used as variable names. Keywords are sometimes called reserved names . 
6
 
You might say that if you search online in this way, then finding a preponderance of 
„search‟ and „programming‟ meanings for „keyword‟ should not come as too much of 
a surprise. But there is a deeper point here. The meaning of the term „keywords‟ itself 
changes.  Current prevalence of a „search‟ sense for „keyword‟ challenges any 
obviousness we might presume in the „Williams sense‟ among readers coming to 
Keywords for the first time, and pushes discussion back a step, into a need to clarify 
what a „keyword‟ is as a starting point in understanding what is distinctive in 
Williams‟s study . 
 
Following Williams‟s own practice of developing his accounts of words as reflective 
essays based on the OED
7
, we might take the OED as a point of departure. „Key-
word‟, and „keyword‟ as a combination, both appear under the entry for the headword 
„key‟ (sense „key‟ n1, 18 comb.). There we find the following:  
(a) a word serving as a key to a cipher or the like („The key-word of these 
inscriptions‟); and (b) a word or thing that is of great importance or 
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 For Webopedia, visit www.webopedia.com  
7
 The OED is the Oxford English Dictionary (www.oed.com ), first published, in parts, as A New 
English Dictionary on Historical Principles, eds, J.A.H.Murray, H.Bradley, W.A.Craigie & C.T.Onions 
(OUP, Oxford, 1884-1928); re-issued (1933); 2
nd
 edition eds, John Simpson and Edmund Weiner 
(1989); 3
rd
 edition in preparation. Histories of the dictionary include the memoir by K.M.Elisabeth 
Murray, Caught in the Web of Words: James A.H.Murray and the Oxford English Dictionary (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1977) and, more recently, Simon Winchester, The Meaning of 
Everything: the story of the Oxford English Dictionary (OUP, Oxford, 2003). For a highly detailed 
account of what each OED entry contains and how to read them, see Donna Lee Berg, A Guide to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (OUP, Oxford, 1993). 
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significance; spec. in information-retrieval systems, any informative word in 
the title or text of a document, etc., chosen as indicating the main content of 
the document. 
What might be called a „significance‟ sense is given in (a) and (b) here alongside the 
specialised „search‟ sense already referred to. The „search‟ sense is seen in the 
following example among quotations later in the entry, „The system can process 
documents represented by a set of keywords.‟  In this sense, exemplified from the 
1960s, a keyword helps you locate something.  The „significance‟ sense is illustrated 
by, among other quotations, an observation by Edmund Blunden: „The key-word is 
the 116th of the Sonnets‟. Understand the keyword, the sense here is, and you will 
understand something unspecified but more important. The two senses are not always 
easy to separate without further context (e.g. in the OED quotation „let us take the 
keyword “science”‟). This is partly because you generally search for things that, at 
least while you are searching, seem things you will attach significance to if you find 
them.  We can speculate, however, that the balance in relative prominence of the 
„search‟ and „significance‟ senses may have altered during the recent period of online 
information (something that may be suggested by but isn‟t provable from the OED 
quotations, which range from 1859 through to 1971).  There is also an important 
difference between the two senses, however, that concerns how you view what 
happens once you've found an instance of your keyword. In one case, your search is 
over. In the other, it is just beginning.  
 
The fact that „keyword‟ is a figurative expression, evoking privileged ways into 
something (a small door into a large room, lifting the lid off a casket), begins to 
explain why the term is used in the titles of reference works that list core technical 
vocabulary for specialized fields. There is a volume called Canadian Constitutional 
Keywords, for instance, as well as Keywords in Language and Literature, and many 
others. In such publications, the focus is on words (that are each made the headword 
for an entry) that may or may not be significant in their everyday sense, if they have 
one, but offer special leverage in understanding some technical field. Implicit in such 
collections is the idea that what you unlock with your keyword will be enriching or at 
least worth unlocking, despite being complex, tangled or otherwise blocked from easy 
access -- hence my room and casket imagery rather than keys to garden sheds or 
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parked bicycles. In this respect, we can contrast „keywords‟ with what you might call 
„symptom-words‟, or words that may still offer a key to understanding a cultural 
milieu but which in themselves appear trivial, as in John Morrish‟s entertaining  
Frantic Semantics, which provides accounts of words such as „full-on‟, „retro‟, 
„benchmarking‟, „anorak‟, „issues‟ and „totty‟.8 
 
Keywords in the „significance‟ sense, then, are words freighted with importance for a 
particular domain.  This is reflected in Williams's focus on the specialised vocabulary 
of debates about „culture and society‟. But Williams introduces a further crucial 
element: some words are not only significant and „complex‟; they are also 
„controversial‟. They are not (or not only) a matter of a distinct, technical sense (or 
senses) that may initially seem opaque but which can be understood if only you have 
a glossary. Rather, Williams‟s keywords present a cluster of interlocking, 
contemporary senses whose interaction remains unresolved across a range of fields of 
thought and discussion. Interaction between the senses can lead to cross purposes and 
confusion in public debate. 
 
To try to understand a „keyword‟, in this more specific sense, you have to engage not 
only with what the word can mean on its own, but also with its complex relations with 
other, similarly complex words.  Why go to all that trouble? Because such words are 
inescapable, in being the building blocks of cultural understanding. They provide both 
the material of thinking to be analysed – when used in earlier discourse -- and also the 
tools for further, new thinking: that is, they are material resources out of which 
concepts for cultural debate are formed. Confuse the words and you won't grasp the 
historical development or current arguments. This in turn will restrict your ability to 
contribute effectively to discussion and planning for what might be called a better 
future.  Williams‟s notion of words as materials that both represent and mediate social 
relations is an essential context for his suggestive characterisation of language use as 
a process in which, „Meanings are offered, felt for, tested, confirmed, asserted, 
qualified, changed‟.9  
                                                 
8
 John Morrish, Frantic Semantics: snapshots of our changing language (Pan Books, London, 1999).  
9
 Williams, Keywords, 12. 
 6 
 
Precedents and parallels 
 
Williams‟s keywords research has I believe made a major contribution to 
understanding how complex words function in culture and society. But his interest in 
the topic is not unique. Nor was it unique, exactly, even in the period when Williams 
was working on his earliest notes. The term „keyword‟ doesn't originate with 
Williams, either, being traceable back to late nineteenth-century semantics and the 
work of Michel Bréal, if not before.
10
  More closely contemporaneous with Williams, 
there are also at least three important parallel investigations, each of which 
illuminates a different aspect of Williams's work: publications by C. S. Lewis, by I. A. 
Richards, and by William Empson. To understand the distinctiveness of Williams's 
contribution, therefore, it will be helpful briefly to recall these precedents and 
parallels before looking at how Keywords entries are structured. I refer to the three 
writers here not in historical sequence (from the 1920s through to 1960) but in terms 
of the type of relation to Keywords I believe they show.  
 
C.S.Lewis 
 
Almost contemporaneous with Williams's early work towards Keywords, C. S. 
Lewis‟s Studies in Words (1960)11 was based on lectures given at Cambridge in the 
late 1950s. For Lewis, the important questions about problematic words are ones of 
philological elucidation. „Key‟ words including „nature‟, „sad‟, „wit‟, „free‟, „sense‟, 
„simple‟, „life‟, and the phrasal formula „I dare say‟ (now meaning roughly 
„probably‟) have changed in meaning, Lewis argues, each radiating out (or 
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 Michel Bréal, Semantics: studies in the science of meaning. [1900] Translated by Mrs Henry Cust 
(Dover, New York, 1964); for discussion of Bréal‟s classification of mechanisms in semantic change, 
see Elizabeth Closs Traugott and Richard B.Dasher, Regularity in Semantic Change (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002)., esp. 52-60. More recently, emphasising connections between lexical 
semantics and social history, Georges Matoré develops the notion of „mots-clés‟ for socially privileged 
key words in his La méthode en lexicologie: Domaine français (Didier, Paris, 1953); for discussion, see 
Stephen Ullmann, Semantics: an introduction to the science of meaning (Blackwell, Oxford, 1962), 
252-3. 
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 C.S.Lewis, Studies in Words  (CUP, Cambridge, 1960).  
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„ramifying‟) from a central meaning.  For Lewis, the past is definitely a different 
country: they don't just do things differently there, they also talk differently; and the 
gap is something you cannot simply mind and step across if you are trying to read 
what Lewis disarmingly calls texts by „old‟ authors.12 Faced with such difficulty, what 
Lewis encourages is less to research word meanings (as some readers feel Williams 
does), than to read the historical source texts, on the basis that „one understands a 
word much better if one has met it alive, in its native habitat‟13. There is a parallel 
here with Williams, in the emphasis Lewis places on avoiding the risk of missing in 
such words „dangerous senses‟ that have the effect of „luring us into misreadings‟14. 
Yet for all the apparent similarity, Lewis's choice of the adjective 'dangerous ' is a 
reminder that for him the risk is only of being led off the safe path of correct 
interpretation into creative but frivolous, dehistoricised meanings of your own.  This 
is unlike Williams, who doesn't entertain a notion of straightforward „correct‟ 
interpretation, even if based on familiarity with the historical record. 
 
I.A.Richards 
 
By the time Williams was demobbed in 1945 and returned, alliteratively, from the 
Kiel Canal to a Cambridge college - only to be struck there (as he memorably recalls 
in the Keywords „Introduction‟) by major shifts in the currency of English discussion 
- I.A.Richards had long gone. Between travels and mountains, Richards was teaching 
at Harvard, where his work on Basic English was already in decline and his 
relationship with C.K.Ogden increasingly strained
15
. Earlier in Cambridge, however, 
in Practical Criticism (1929) and before that in collaboration with Ogden in The 
Meaning of Meaning (1923), Richards had also been concerned with problematic 
keywords. For him, the issue is not only one of misreading local „dangerous‟ senses 
but of the general, multi-layered nature of the interpretive process.  Richards identifies 
for example a number of especially important words in criticism („meaning‟, „belief‟, 
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 Lewis, Studies in Words, 13. 
13
 Lewis, Studies in Words, 2. 
14
 Lewis, Studies in Words, 13. 
15
 See John Paul Russo, I.A.Richards: his life and work (Routledge, 1989). 
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„sincerity‟, „sentimentality‟, „rhythm‟, „understanding‟, and others16) that act 
unhelpfully as „blunderbusses‟: when they and similar words are used, „a cloud of 
heterogeneous missiles instead of a single meaning is discharged on each occasion‟17. 
Failure to sift the spread-shot fired in such words is now often thought to have been 
for Richards a narrowly literary-critical matter; but Richards was as concerned, 
especially after the 1920s, to chart misreadings in political discourse, language 
learning, and in acquisition and use of Basic English. Much of Richards's career, in 
fact - in this respect anticipating Williams (though note also the reservations Williams 
expresses about Richards in Culture and Society
18
) - can be read as a series of efforts 
in different domains to investigate such communication problems and how reason and 
analysis can overcome them. 
 
William Empson 
 
References to I. A. Richards in C.S.Lewis mainly express a debt Lewis felt towards 
the earlier scholar. But that debt is occasionally qualified by doubts in areas where he 
inclined more to the view of the author of the third important parallel with Keywords, 
William Empson. Among other works, Empson published The Structure of Complex 
Words in 1951, which lays out a framework of „semantic equations‟ through which 
verbal senses can interact, in a given context, to produce statements reliant on 
implications, purposeful puns and double meanings. The parallels (and also contrasts) 
with Keywords are seen more clearly, however, in Empson‟s review of the first 
edition of Keywords in New York Review of Books in 1977,
19
 a review which is 
critical sometimes to the point of conveying exasperation. 
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 I.A.Richards, Practical Criticism (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1929), 340. 
17
 Richards, Practical Criticism, 300. 
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 Williams points to two difficulties he sees with Richards: an „element of passivity in his idea of the 
relationship between reader and work‟ (Culture and Society, 244), and a concern with global 
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 William Empson, „Compacted Doctrines: Raymond Williams, Keywords: a vocabulary of culture 
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Windus, London, 1987), 184-9. Empson incorporates some sections of the review into his „Comment 
for third edition‟ of  The Structure of Complex Words [1951], 3rd edition (Chatto and Windus, 1979). 
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What seems most to inspire Empson's exasperation is a vagueness he detects in 
Williams‟s account of „interaction‟ between a word‟s multiple senses.  For Empson, 
the idea -- which he develops in his own work and also attributes to Williams - that „a 
word can become a compacted doctrine‟20 depends on different senses arising 
„naturally in one context‟21: sense A of a word must simultaneously represent sense B 
to a reader, in order to communicate the statement in question. Empson points 
critically in his review to Williams's account of interest, where Empson suggests this 
is unlikely to be the case. For Williams, by contrast, interaction between senses, as we 
will see, only sometimes occurs within a single use (for instance when a value 
judgement inherent in a word points in two directions simultaneously or where, as 
Empson approvingly notes, „a controversial word contains both sides of the 
controversy in itself‟22). In many other cases, interaction between senses appears to 
take place more at the level of the language community, over a period during which 
senses compete for saliency or have different social distributions, „interacting‟ only in 
the abstract general sense of communication and miscommunication between social 
dialects.  
 
The significance of this difference should not be underestimated. Through his lens, 
Empson sees „compacted doctrines‟ in a word as something created by a writer or 
speaker‟s artifice, which can be grasped -- and accepted or rejected -- by a reader.  For 
Williams, by contrast (at least in Empson's view) the effect of complex words is „a 
dark picture as a whole‟ in which the words exert considerable power over the 
language user‟s ideas; but this is only, Empson insists, because of „a theory which 
makes our minds feebler than they are‟.23 Diverging sharply from Williams at this 
point, Empson emphasises our rational ability to choose words rather than be affected 
by them, and suggests that the important research question about keywords that 
                                                 
20
  As well as giving the title to the Williams review, „compacted doctrines‟ is also an essential concept 
in The Structure of Complex Words . See for example the opening paragraph of Chapter 2, „Statements 
in words‟, 39. For further comparative discussion of Empson and Williams, see Alan Durant and Colin 
MacCabe, „Compacted doctrines: Empson and the meanings of words‟, in, Christopher Norris and 
Nigel Mapp (eds), William Empson: the critical achievement (CUP, Cambridge, 1993), 170-95. 
21
 Empson, „Compacted Doctrines‟, 185. 
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 Empson, „Compacted Doctrines‟, 187. 
23
 Empson, „Compacted Doctrines‟, 184. 
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Williams should address is „under what conditions are they able to impose a belief 
that the speaker would otherwise resist?‟24    
 
Exactly what Williams made of the criticism that Keywords encourages passivity in 
the face of verbal complexity -- a charge echoing his own criticism of Richards in 
Culture and Society
25
 -- it is difficult to say. There is little or no evidence either of 
Empson's work in general or of the review of Keywords itself having any particular 
impact on Williams; and he didn't use the occasion of the 1983 second edition as an 
opportunity to reply. 
 
The Keywords ‘Introduction’  
 
Each of the parallel studies outlined here offers a glimpse of a different dimension of 
Williams's work that I explore in more detail below. Williams outlines his own aims 
in Keywords in the first edition‟s justly celebrated „Introduction‟.  Keywords evolved, 
Williams says, from his exploration of the word „culture‟ in his adult education 
classes. But neither the word itself nor the concept of culture, he found, could be 
understood without referring to a cluster of other words with which it interacts. 
Williams recalls that 
 
the words I linked it with, because of the problems its uses raised in my mind, 
were class and art, and then industry and democracy. I could feel these five 
words as a kind of structure. 
26
 
 
At one level, then, Keywords is a „a record of an inquiry [sic] into a vocabulary: a 
shared body of words and meanings in our most general discussions, in English, of the 
practices and institutions which we group as culture and society’.27  The narrative that 
begins with Williams‟s unsettling return to Cambridge leads on to a revelatory 
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 Empson, „Compacted Doctrines‟, 188. 
25
 See n.18 above. 
26
 Williams,  Keywords, 13. See also the „Introduction‟ to  Culture and Society, 13-19. 
27
 Williams,  Keywords, 15. 
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moment in Seaford, in the basement of the public library, where Williams sees in the 
OED entry for culture a skeleton answer to questions he had been puzzling over. 
From there, the course of the inquiry moves to the cutting of the „keywords‟ appendix 
from Culture and Society for reasons of length, and the ensuing collection of notes on 
the initial 60 words (and gradually others) for a further two decades.  Throughout this 
long development, Williams reports how he was prompted, by questions immediately 
at hand, to consider meaning change as an interaction between what might now be 
understood as change in the language system and change in historically conditioned 
instances of language use: that is, as a process through which new ways of exploiting 
the meaning potential conventionally available in a word cumulatively alter the 
meaning of that word.   
 
The necessary context for such linguistic interest remained for Williams one of 
encountering difficult words in practical discussion.  
 
Every word which I have included has at some time, in the course of some 
argument, virtually forced itself on my attention because the problems of its 
meaning seemed to me inextricably bound up with the problems it was being 
used to discuss. [....]  I began to see this experience as a problem of 
vocabulary, in two senses: the available and developing meanings of known 
words, which needed to be set down; and the explicit but as often implicit 
connections which people were making, in what seemed to me, again and 
again, particular formations of meaning - ways not only of discussing but at 
another level of seeing many of our central experiences. 
28
 
Williams goes on from this sense of practical urgency in trying to understand words to 
generalise about the particular words he is interested in, as a group: 
 
We find a history and complexity of meanings; conscious changes, or 
consciously different uses; innovation, obsolescence, specialization, extension, 
overlap, transfer; or changes which are masked by a nominal continuity so that 
words which seem to have been there for centuries, with continuous general 
meanings, have come in fact to express radically different or radically 
                                                 
28
 Williams,  Keywords, 15. 
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variable, yet sometimes hardly noticed, meanings and implications of 
meaning.
29
 
Beyond the historical interest evident here (with its recognisable connections with 
Lewis), Williams forges links between the meaning and use of words and tensions in 
the social formations in which people live. Keywords don‟t only, in this view,  give 
rise to „dangerous‟ misunderstandings because words are difficult and have lots of 
senses; they are also connected with potentially quite a different order of danger, 
reflecting political interests and enacting real social conflicts. Williams was never 
interested only in words and their meanings, as arguably a lexicographer or philologist 
might be. Repeatedly he stresses interaction between verbal practices and other, social 
processes: his historical semantics forms part of a more general materialist history in 
which thought and language are integral elements of social reflection and action.  
 
At the most general level, accordingly, the aim of Keywords is, „to show that some 
important social and historical processes occur within language, in ways which 
indicate how integral the problems of meanings and of relationships really are‟.30 A 
dialectical relationship is posited between meaning variation and change, on the one 
hand, and changing social formations on the other.  To chart the dialectic is to map 
social conflict as much as the sorts of conventional linguistic processes of semantic 
change identified from Bréal onwards. Summing up these points in response to an 
interview question in Politics and Letters, Williams argues that, „like any other social 
production‟ language „is the arena of all sorts of shifts and interests and relations of 
dominance‟. Verbal signs, accordingly, 
 
take on the changeable and often reversed social relations of a given society, 
so that what enters into them is the contradictory and conflict-ridden social 
history of the people who speak the language, including all the variations 
between signs at any given time. [...] Certain shifts of meaning indicate very 
interesting periods of confusion and contradiction of outcome, latencies in 
decision, and other processes of a real social history, which can be located 
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 Williams,  Keywords, 17. 
30
 Williams,  Keywords, 22. 
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rather precisely in this way, and put alongside more familiar kinds of 
evidence. 
31
 
 
Structure of a Keywords entry 
 
If Williams had written only the „Introduction‟ to Keywords, not the entries 
themselves, his work should still stand as a valuable contribution to our understanding 
of word meaning.  But Keywords overall is less a study in the theory of meaning than 
a collection of entries for individual words. How do those entries carry through what 
Williams proposes in the „Introduction‟?  In this section I describe what a typical 
Keywords entry consists of. In doing so, I focus not so much on editorial issues (such 
as how reference is made to a word‟s „immediate forerunner‟ or to the „ultimate 
traceable word, from which “root” meanings are derived‟32) as on the argument about 
meaning being developed through each entry. 
 
Keywords entries typically begin with a statement that the word in question is 
difficult, or that, even if it looks simple, it isn't.   So for instance, „Nature is perhaps 
the most complex word in the language‟ and „culture is one of the two or three most 
complicated words in the English language‟. Lower down the lexical top ten, but still 
giving cause for concern, we learn that „Bourgeois is a very difficult word to use in 
English…‟;  „Humanity belongs to a complex group of words‟; „Liberal has, at first 
sight, so clear a political meaning that some of its further associations are puzzling…;  
„Utilitarian has one complication…‟; and „Violence is often now a difficult word, 
because its primary sense is of physical assault…. yet it is also used more widely in 
ways that are not easy to define‟. 
 
The source of difficulty in each case becomes clearer if we look further into a 
particular entry: 
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 Williams,  Politics & Letters, 176 – 7. 
32
 See, „Abbreviations‟, in Williams,  Keywords, 29. 
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Alienation is now one of the most difficult words in the language.  Quite apart 
from its common usage in general contexts, it carries specific but disputed 
meanings in a range of disciplines from social and economic theory to philosophy 
and psychology. […] … it is often confusing because of overlap and uncertainty 
in relation both to the various specific meanings and the older more general 
meanings.   
 
Difficulties arise, in effect, because a range of senses that have followed different 
historical paths now coexist, sometimes with one or more parallel technical senses as 
well as a range of other, lay senses that cut across each other in unpredictable ways. 
Williams's presentation of such difficulty appears to support Empson's comment, in 
his review of Keywords, that „the primary aim is to clear up confusion‟.33  But the 
confusions aren't all of the same kind, and we should distinguish at least two types. 
 
The first kind of difficulty may be thought of as diachronic (or to do with historical 
change in meaning).  The various meanings of a given word, in this perspective, are 
like historical strata or layers. Some of the word‟s meanings may persist into the 
present; but others will have become recessive and possibly disappeared altogether.  
In order to engage with discourse from earlier periods -- as is essential in cultural 
analysis, if we are to understand the beliefs and values of earlier members of what we 
take to be the same language community -- it is necessary to identify senses that the 
speaker or writer could have intended.  With diachronic confusion, accordingly, the 
overlap between Williams and Lewis‟s „dangerous senses‟ is at its strongest. 
 
The other kind of difficulty is synchronic (to do with the language system as any user 
mentally models it at a given point in time).  The difficult word is polysemous, having 
multiple, concurrent senses that are historically and semantically related. For 
example, liberal is used in a narrowly technical, party political sense, but also in a 
broader political sense that characterises a spectrum of positions, not all of which are 
„liberal‟ in the first sense.  The word is also widely used in other, non-political senses, 
for example meaning „generous‟; and each sense is amenable to a positive or negative 
spin depending on context and the assumed beliefs of the addressee. The significance 
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of such concurrent senses for Williams is not, as it typically is in Empson, how they 
can be overlaid to create multiple or ambiguous meanings in a single use,
34
 but rather 
how, on the tongues of different interlocutors, they trip up discussion, obscuring and 
entangling socially important arguments that might be advanced by using them. 
 
Synchronic and diachronic difficulties with word meaning are separated here for the 
purpose of exposition.  But for Williams they are inextricably linked by the fact that 
we can only properly understand the present by reflecting on the symbolic resources 
in which we articulate our own circumstances (or, put in a different vocabulary, by 
seeing the symbolic other in the composition of the self).  The challenge in analysing 
meaning is for Williams accordingly not the conventional „history of the language‟ 
one of describing how the language system acquired by any language user comes to 
be as it is. Rather, the question is how any culturally-situated person can actively 
think, selecting among options for conceptualisation and expression that are shared 
with others in the language community but which have also been conditioned by the 
history of the language each speaker inherits, differently, and to different extents. 
 
These questions are implicit in the opening statements of difficulty to be found in 
most Keywords entries. The main body of the entry is then largely descriptive. 
Beginning with an etymology often adapted from the OED, Williams works through a 
succession of meaning changes and simultaneous variants towards the current array of 
meanings.  Supporting quotations are provided (also often drawn from the OED, but 
sometimes set in a fuller context than would be possible there).  In some entries, 
reference is made to relevant developments in other languages, for instance in 
alienation, where Williams writes that „the argument is difficult and is made more 
difficult by the relations between the German and English key words‟; or in 
                                                 
34
 Empson's most vivid statement of how apparent „unity‟ of meaning is achieved from a cluster of 
possible senses occurs in the final chapter of Seven Types of Ambiguity, and follows the common 
modernist trope of a chemical reaction: „It is these faint and separate judgments of probability which 
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reaction.  As a rule, all that you recognise as in your mind is the one final association of meanings 
which seems sufficiently rewarding to be the answer – „now I have understood that‟; it is only at 
intervals at the strangeness of the process can be observed.‟, Seven Types of Ambiguity [1930] 
(Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1961), 277. 
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exploitation, where we are referred to „the main French development…‟  Williams 
shows frequent interest in such interaction between languages, acknowledging how  
 
many of the most important words that I have worked on either developed key 
meanings in languages other than English, or went through a complicated and 
interactive development in a number of major languages. Where I have been 
able in part to follow this, as in alienation or culture, its significance has been 
so evident that we are bound to feel the lack of it when such tracing has not 
been possible.‟35 
 
What is notable, however, is that Williams is not particularly concerned with 
commenting on linguistic mechanisms of semantic change. There are throughout 
Keywords numerous, informal references to such mechanisms, for example to 
changes that occur „by analogy‟, to occasions when a sense is „extended‟, or when 
there is „a degree of habituation to the metaphor‟. But there is little by way of 
reference to mechanisms identified in historical semantics, despite bibliographical 
references at the end of Keywords which range from Bréal, through Trier, Stern and 
Spitzer, to Ullmann.
36
 
 
There is a reason for this.  Williams is less concerned with general semantic 
mechanisms because he is more concerned with the pressures under which people 
have extended or transformed word meanings.  He places special emphasis on 
adversarial uses, as in the repeated phrase, „there is then both controversy and 
complexity in the term‟; and examples are especially prominent in which change is 
motivated by valorisation of a word away from any neutral descriptive sense, 
including commonly where the word begins to occur „with a derogatory implication‟. 
In the case of wealth, for example, Williams points to development of „a strong 
subsidiary deprecatory sense‟, and in welfare to „a subsidiary meaning, usually 
derogatory in the recorded instances‟. He draws attention to „adversarial uses of 
jargon’, and to the fact that liberal „has been loaded with the aspersions of its 
enemies just as much as with the consequences of its own assumptions…‟ With 
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liberal, he goes on to point out how „the word has been under regular and heavy 
attack‟, being frequently used „as a pejorative term‟ to make up a „familiar 
complaint‟, extending even to „being used as a loose swear word‟. In Williams‟s 
account, words are not only (as they are for Richards) blunderbusses that can be 
misfired; they are also artillery to be purposefully aimed. 
 
In some entries, what is at issue is the complete reversal of a word‟s semantic 
prosody, or emotive potential. This is the case with modern, where „the majority of 
pre-C19 uses were unfavourable, when the context was comparative […] but through 
the C19 and very markedly in C20 there was a strong movement the other way, until 
modern became virtually equivalent to IMPROVED (q.v.) or satisfactory or 
efficient‟. Sometimes it is primarily such evaluative use that causes confusion, by 
pointing in two different directions at the same time, as with idealism, where 
Williams suggests that „one of the crucial difficulties […] is that, especially in some 
of its derived words, it is used, often loosely, for both praise and blame‟, or with 
commercial, which „could be used either favourably or unfavourably‟. In this respect 
ordinary is anything but ordinary, since the word „has a curious history and 
implication‟ by means of which the same expression „ordinary people‟ can be used „to 
express social attitude or prejudice in effectively opposite ways.‟ 
 
Such acute attention to use of the same word in contexts shaped by very different 
speaker intentions, as well as different assumptions likely to be activated by the 
addressee, suggests that Williams would not have been uncomfortable with a recent 
shift of emphasis that has taken place in historical accounts of meaning: from 
semantics to pragmatics, and away from the idea of  a series of distinct meanings in a 
word towards the view that speakers or writers stretch a word's meaning in a 
particular context while retaining enough of its established sense to make the new use 
intelligible, with such pragmatic use then re-analysed as part of the word's semantics, 
so bringing about the meaning change.
37
 
 
                                                 
37
 This is an inevitably simplified statement of Traugott and Dasher‟s „invited inference theory of 
semantic change‟ (IITSC), in which inferences regularly associated with linguistic material are 
gradually conventionalised as semantic meanings. See Traugott and Dasher, Regularity in Semantic 
Change. 
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Towards the end of each entry, Williams moves towards either of two typical codas. 
The first is a return to the pitfalls in contemporary use and how they afflict social 
practice.  Culture is the prime case. Williams suggests that, 
 
Within these complex arguments there are fundamentally opposed as well as 
effectively overlapping positions; there are also, understandably, many unresolved 
questions and confused answers.  But these arguments and questions cannot be 
resolved by reducing the complexity of actual usage. […] the complexity, that is 
to say, is not finally in the word but in the problems which its variations of use 
significantly indicate. 
 
Such an ending may in reality only restate the word‟s problems. But in doing so such 
endings typically emphasise not only the challenge presented by the word to discourse 
comprehension but also why it needs to be addressed in specific areas of social 
practice.   
 
The other kind of ending takes the form of reference to relations between the 
headword and other words in the same semantic field: how the cluster of words 
together creates distinctions, not necessarily in a neat or uniform way but with 
overlapping senses because of the complex social history. The shift towards more 
thesaurus-like presentation – which is something more significant than, as Empson 
describes it, the entries usually having „some derivatives and opposites thrown in‟38 - 
is perhaps the main significance of Keywords being a „vocabulary‟ rather than a 
dictionary.  In either format, the same overall task of form-function mapping is going 
on; but in the thesaurus approach, what is in question is not mapping from one form to 
multiple functions (a single word that has a number of polysemous senses), but rather 
mapping from one function to multiple forms (investigating how a network of words 
can lay claim to different aspects of an area of mental space)
39
.  
 
                                                 
38
 Empson, „Compacted Doctrines‟, 184. 
39
 This distinction is inevitably caught up in theoretical problems of word meaning, especially in the 
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Part of the history of welfare, for example, is explained because „Most of the older 
words in this sense (see especially „charity‟) had acquired unacceptable associations‟.   
And with idealism, „The subsequent complexities of meaning can be indicated by 
pairing of opposites‟, something which also happens with radical, whose 20th-
century history is largely explained in a series of contrasts.  Among the most 
interesting cases of how a word sits in its lexical field is myth, which we are told 
„alternated with fable, being distinguished from legend which, though perhaps 
unreliable, was related to history and from allegory which might be fabulous but 
which indicated some reality.‟  In this web of sense relations (which go far beyond 
conventional classification into synonymy, hyponymy, meronymy, etc.) what is 
striking is Williams‟s ease in switching between a so-called „semasiological‟ 
approach (the „dictionary‟ perspective, moving from word to meaning) and an 
„onamasiological‟ approach (the thesaurus perspective, concerned with how 
conceptual areas are divided up between different words).
40
  Where what are 
effectively thesaurus descriptions conclude dictionary entries, Williams signals an 
underlying theme of Keywords: how societies in different periods create differing 
configurations of senses for any given cultural domain.  Those senses are the 
resources available - by habit, by ideology, or (in a more Sapir-Whorfian view) as the 
basic capability for thought that language allows - for political and cultural reflection, 
mutual understanding, and intercultural dialogue.
41
   
 
Concern with how far cultural thought may be determined by a society's keywords - 
never precisely stated by Williams as a thesis - has been marginalised over the last 
twenty years by research suggesting the universality of cognition.
42
 But the arguments 
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 See, for example, Brent Berlin and Paul Kay, Basic Color Terms: their universality and evolution 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1969).  
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are not conclusive. As regards cultural keywords in particular, the case for language 
determining thought has recently been revived in publications by Anna Wierzbicka, 
for example in Understanding Cultures through their Key Words (1997)
43
. Working 
against dominant directions of cognitive semantics, which stresses how thought 
shapes language rather than the reverse
44
, Wierzbicka examines keywords as „focal 
points around which entire cultural domains are organized‟45, and presents case 
studies including the English words „freedom‟, „friendship‟, and „homeland‟ 
juxtaposed with their nearest equivalents in other languages. Wierzbicka‟s studies 
differ significantly from Williams in important respects, nevertheless. By 
decomposing complex words into semantic primitives, for example (i.e. into their 
presumed, basic constitutive elements of meaning), and then formulating those 
primitives in what Wierzbicka calls „Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM)‟, 
Wierzbicka tries to establish a method for point-for-point comparison between 
complex words and concepts across languages and cultures. 
 
Reception and use  
 
Having looked both at Williams's arguments about meaning in the „Introduction‟ and 
at what Keywords offers in its roughly 300 pages, it is reasonable
46
 now to ask what 
readers have made of those pages. Competition for the most owned but least read 
book is stiff, in historical semantics as elsewhere. As far as I can tell from informal 
reader feedback, the „Introduction‟ is still read in literary, cultural and political 
academic circles; but less attention is typically given to individual entries. It is 
therefore worth asking -- leaving aside other interesting questions about the book‟s 
reception -- in what circumstances a reader is likely to look up a word in Keywords 
rather than in other reference sources that may initially appear similar. 
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Most commonly, readers report looking up a word while engaged in reading a 
particular text. They say they want to discover, when facing an immediate intellectual 
difficulty such as what equality meant for the Levellers or what society means in 
Hume, how the word in question has been used differently in different contexts. This 
use of Keywords combines the reference function of a general dictionary with the 
more specialised coverage of a topic-specific dictionary: Keywords is viewed as a 
dictionary of technical terms in „culture and society‟ (i.e. as a historicised, technical 
glossary roughly equivalent to the Canadian constitutional keywords volume referred 
to above).   
 
Other readers, especially students, report using Keywords as a sort of conceptual 
outline or crash course for a given area, especially at the beginning of an academic 
project or programme. The relevant Keywords entry provides historical context, for 
instance of media or sociology if you are studying one of those subjects, or of topics 
within a course of study, such as reform or technology. The purpose of this kind of 
reading is to move beyond simplistic or unnuanced use of complex and perhaps 
forbidding terms, building confidence as a preliminary to more detailed study. Such 
readings reflect a „history of ideas‟ motivation, sketching how the same term can label 
changing concepts in different schools of thought, as well as in different periods.  
 
Other readers again -- impressionistically, a minority -- report what I take to be a 
more far-reaching use of  Keywords: engaging with an entry in order to clarify 
trajectories in continuing, as yet unresolved arguments (that is, as a tool for 
developing arguments still in progress rather than positions already taken up). 
Engaging with a word‟s history and current polysemy in this way brings about a shift 
from consumer of to participant in current debate, and changes a reader‟s relation to 
language. Such reading adds a further significance to the Williams quotation in my 
title, „Meanings offered, felt for, tested, confirmed, asserted, qualified, changed‟. The 
processes of offering, feeling, testing, confirming, and so on are in this context not 
just an alternative terminology for describing semantic processes (more precisely, 
pragmatic processes) in the history of the language; they also characterize ways of 
thinking, or feeling our way into and testing out, new ideas and positions. 
 22 
 
But what of the overall reception of Keywords?  Even presuming that the different 
kinds of reading I have identified take place on quite a substantial scale, I suspect that 
Williams would have been disappointed by how little Keywords -- or the kind of 
attention to meaning it advocates -- now plays a part in political discussion.  That 
disappointment could only be compounded by the fact that Williams hardly separated 
academic and political applications of his work. Rather, he urges an importance for 
Keywords as 
 an exploration of the vocabulary of a crucial area of social and cultural 
discussion, which has been inherited within precise historical and social 
conditions and which has to be made at once conscious and critical - subject to 
change as well as to continuity - if the millions of people in whom it is active 
are to see it as active: not a tradition to be learnt, nor a consensus to be 
accepted, nor a set of meanings which, because it is 'our language', has a 
natural authority; but as a shaping and reshaping, in real circumstances and 
from profoundly different and important points of view: a vocabulary to use, 
to find our ways in, to change as we find it necessary to change it, as we go on 
making our own language and history.
47
 
 
Likely disappointment regarding the impact of Keywords a quarter of a century after 
its publication might nevertheless have been tempered for Williams by what, in one 
sense at least, could be called a kind of realism.  As well as always taking a long view 
of historical struggle, Williams also expressed reservations about semantic and 
lexicographical work as a force for change, unless tied into other kinds of social 
practice.  Having drafted Keywords entries initially during the 1950s, aware of the 
slightly earlier General Semantics movement
48, he later notes in the „Introduction‟ a 
crucial limit to the public value of work on meaning:  
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I do not share the optimism, or the theories which underlie it, of that popular 
kind of inter-war and surviving semantics which supposed that clarification of 
difficult words would help in the resolution of disputes conducted in their 
terms and often evidently confused by them. I believe that to understand the 
complexities of the meanings of class contributes very little to the resolution 
of actual class disputes and class struggles.
49
  
 
Beyond 2000? 
 
In his final years, Williams wrote explicitly of resources of hope, rhetorically directed 
towards the millennium year 2000. Beyond 2000 now, his approach to analysing 
cultural issues is less practised and less valued.  Sometimes Williams's work is 
pigeonholed in its entirety as „Marxist‟, in an apparently self-evident deprecatory 
sense. Whatever view you take of such criticism, there is an urgency that comes from 
continuing language use in looking again at how Williams's Keywords research, 
which invites scrutiny against historical evidence, relates to our ways of talking to one 
another about serious topics in the 21
st
 century .   
 
Changes of political climate – as well as changes, too, in meteorological climate - no 
doubt have implications as regards the appropriate editorial agenda for any revised 
edition of Keywords, actual or imagined.  Greater emphasis would arguably now need 
to be placed on semantic fields including globalisation and the market, religion, rights 
and responsibilities, respect and inclusion, gender and ethnic politics, and others.  
Correspondingly, some of the attention Williams gives to terminology associated with 
Marxism could be reduced (e.g. hegemony or socialist), as political debates he was 
monitoring and contributing to have shifted. Much of this need for and process of 
                                                                                                                                            
Chapter 4 („Semantics and society‟), 40-58. Interestingly, many of the examples Leech links to 
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revising – however you view the outcomes– is addressed in the „Preface‟ to the 
Blackwell New Keywords. 
 
While Keywords is a political book, however, it is not a book about politics.  Current 
headwords are to be found less in large-scale political changes – the collapse of the 
Soviet Union,  the rise of economic liberalism in China, 9/11, two wars in Iraq, etc -- 
than in cultural arguments that such events both reflect and inspire. There is no easily 
mapped route from political upheavals, no matter how seismic, into what a culture‟s 
keywords are; those words have to be found in public discussion and cannot be read 
off from the news or the paradigm of any given academic discipline.  Part of the 
reason words become keywords, in fact (and a reason for not being too hasty in 
making wholesale changes to Williams's list) is because of an appearance particular 
words create of continuity, while disguising changes of meaning and perception they 
are used to express as well as very different facts and circumstances they are used to 
refer to.  
 
Beyond the wordlist, however, there is a need to address other aspects of Keywords, 
which may also be seen most easily in a new light by considering what it would mean 
to update the volume.   
 
Deciding what the keywords are is one thing, researching them is another.  Williams, 
as we have seen, had his own method for doing this, reading around and expanding 
OED entries, linking shades of meaning to difficulties he could see in contemporary 
social discussion. There is no straightforward way of updating that method, for 
example by projecting from Williams's engagement with the linguistics or 
lexicography of his period.  Williams's approach to meaning was a sort of verbal 
problem-solving, anchored (so he suggests in Culture and Society) in „not a series of 
abstracted problems, but a series of statements by individuals‟.50  Indeed he seems not 
to have engaged much with the semantic scholarship of the 1960s, 70s or early 80s (as 
is reflected in the way that the references in the bibliography, even in 1983, still end 
with Ullmann, still misspelt as „Ullman‟).51   
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 Given the trajectory of Williams‟s work, it is not surprising that he showed little interest in 1960s 
theories of lexical decomposition (such as Katz and Fodor).  But it is surprising he didn‟t engage with 
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There is an instructive parallel with William Empson here, which becomes more 
noticeable with time and distance. Williams‟s intricate work on the complexity of 
verbal meaning, like Empson's, has received little attention from linguists.
52
 To 
understand why, and what implications may follow as regards studying keywords in 
future, we need to consider possible reasons for such apparent neglect.   
 
For lexicographers, Keywords can appear a series of impressive mini-essays based on 
lexicographical work mostly already available in the OED. From the perspective of 
synchronic semantics and pragmatics, Williams appears interested in social rather 
than cognitive processes of meaning making, and so inevitably seems peripheral to 
the main research goals of the field.  Even for historical semantics, the lexical items 
Williams investigates are idiosyncratic and relatively infrequently used, with (as 
Williams himself shows, though he would have rejected the distinction) social rather 
than linguistic causes motivating the shifts in meaning. In historical semantics, by 
contrast, the main focus is on regularity of semantic change, and so on those meaning 
changes which are most likely to explain aspects of the language system.
53
 Apparent 
neglect of Keywords in linguistics may accordingly be as much to do with narrow 
disciplinary goals as with scepticism or indifference.  But whatever the reasons, the 
result is the same: Keywords is now taken most seriously in cultural studies, with the 
consequence that subsequent work written by a generation of cultural studies scholars 
influenced by Williams is more concerned with history of ideas rather than with 
analysing the vocabulary of culture and society. 
                                                                                                                                            
(for instance) notions of meaning as use in Wittgenstein, or the idea of performative utterances in 
Austin, or the approach to implied meaning developed by Grice. And as regards lexicography, it may 
be unsurprising that Williams didn't engage with theoretical arguments, from the early 1970s onwards, 
to do with how much work is done by inference in calibrating a word‟s meaning in a given context. But 
given Williams‟s admiration for the OED, it does seem puzzling that he never addresses the issue of 
how sense boundaries are established. (For a recent, thought-provoking discussion of sense boundaries, 
see William Croft and D. Alan Cruse, Cognitive Linguistics (CUP, Cambridge, 2004), Chapter 5, „The 
construal of sense boundaries‟, 109-40. 
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Such an academic split between different dimensions of the social production of 
meanings has if anything increased since Williams. This is regrettable, especially 
because the development of electronic search capabilities applied to large corpora of 
language use (techniques collectively known as corpus linguistics) encourages 
renewed attention to cultural keywords. Searching for uses of words on the scale such 
methods allow was simply not possible for Williams.  He records how he read 
carefully and repeatedly through texts in order to find examples (how he searched for 
uses of society in Hume is a case in point).  Now a search that might have taken 
several weeks can be done in a few minutes. 
 
Corpora make possible many different kinds of result, not only bare lists of word 
tokens.  For example, a search can present and compare relative frequencies (of the 
target word generally; of a specific sense of the target word; of the target word during 
a specified period of time; and so on); or it can analyse patterns of collocation (that is, 
different kinds of association between the target word and other words around it). For 
the kinds of question Williams explores in Keywords, the principal technique is likely 
to be basic concordancing: the display, as a list, of all instances of a word in a selected 
corpus (whether in a particular book, in works by a particular author, or in work in a 
particular genre or period). Each instance appears centred on the screen or page, 
preceded and followed by a selected number of words to provide enough context for 
analysis of how the target word in the concordance line is being used.
54
  
 
It is a coincidence of the terminology that such a concordance line is usually now 
known as a „key-word-in-context‟ (or KWIC). In corpus linguistics, the term 
„keyword‟ here is usually meant in just its search sense. But „KWIC‟ in a Keywords 
context reunites the two senses outlined above: the search sense of „keyword‟ (the 
concordancer finds each instance of the word in the corpus) and the significance sense 
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(Keywords keywords, if they can be called that, are worth displaying because of what 
Williams calls, in his „Introduction‟ to Culture and Society, their „capital 
importance‟55).   
 
New electronic tools will not provide magic answers to the problems Williams was 
concerned with, however. This is partly because of the variable sense of the other 
major word in the expression „key-word-in-context‟: „context‟. For most linguistic 
purposes, context in a concordance line only needs to be a sequence of 5 -- 20 words 
on either side of the target word, enough to indicate immediate collocation.  Evidence 
in the small „frame‟ around the word can usually be found to show how the speaker or 
writer is treating the sense given to the word: as new, or as somehow in need of 
explanation, or as slightly old-fashioned or pejorative, etc.
56
 For Williams, by 
contrast, relevant context meant a far larger body of material.  His extensive reading 
may have been slow but it had compensating strengths: it allowed him, for instance, to 
read for minor shifts of sense for which evidence might only emerge in large-scale, 
higher-order thematic or discursive patterns. Publication of Keywords in a reference 
format tends to obscure this value in Williams‟s scholarship, creating an illusion that 
keywords were even then something to be simply looked up.  Choice of format may 
even contribute to the not uncommon opinion that Williams‟s insights are better 
reflected in studies like The Country and the City (1973)
57
 than in Keywords itself, 
where there is sometimes a tension between arguments encapsulated in reference form 
and discussion struggling for space. 
 
What would continuing work on keywords achieve? In general terms, such work 
would test how far a variationist account of meaning change (i.e. one in which 
meanings coexist in shifting patterns across a population and produce overall 
semantic change only as a result of many small-scale shifts in use) can be tracked in 
complex keywords of the lexicon using current electronic search techniques. One 
research problem of special interest within this general field of enquiry would be 
Williams's interest in causation - arguably his own unfinished business: how any new 
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 Williams,  Culture and Society, 13. 
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 In this respect, reading a concordance line still draws on methods Murray outlines in his 1870 leaflet 
for OED volunteer readers on choosing illustrative quotations; see Winchester The Meaning of 
Everything, 109.  
57
 Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (Chatto and Windus, 1973). 
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meaning diffuses or is propagated across the language community by different social 
groups. Williams freely acknowledged that the practical difficulties in this area are 
severe.  But when pressed in a Politics and Letters interview on how far it would be 
possible to look „at the first usages of terms or pilot shifts in meaning, and then at the 
diffusion of those usages and shifts, tracing the forces which were the bearers of them 
- in other words, writing a socially explanatory history‟,58 Williams replied with a 
clear invitation to post-Keywords research: 
 
Once one has plotted the extraordinary transformations of a word like 
'interest', for example, the next step would be to see in which areas of society 
specific usages of it started, in which they were then reversed, and so on. […] 
In some cases a very close and differentiated account would be necessary, 
showing in which group a change of meaning started to occur, and then how 
and whether it was generalised - either diffused through the general 
educational system or in some other way, or remaining a term within a specific 
class. All these possibilities have to be explored. 
59
 
 
The possibilities all have to be explored.  Electronic corpora are, at least for some 
relevant areas, available to make such analysis if not easy at least not entirely fanciful. 
There are challenging tasks of interpretation alongside the searching. Much of the 
pioneering work Williams started in Keywords and elsewhere, tracing meaning 
backwards and forwards between linguistic analysis and historical and political 
commentary, is there waiting to be continued. 
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